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Section I: Introduction 
  The main purpose of the research discussed in this paper 
has been to try to understand the main determinants of labor 
productivity within a firm from the perspective of the worker 
through a model and econometric application. Understanding why 
workers do the best they can or "just make time" is at the heart 
of the issue. 
Yugoslavian labor managed firms are often thought to  
have an advantage in their use of potential labor compared to  
more autocratically structured firms. A general understanding of 
what makes labor more productive may elucidate the 
practitioners' understandings and enable the analysis of 
proposed changes in firm structure in capitalist and etatist  
countries (such as profit-sharing plans) to rest on a firmer 
theoretical foundation. In this paper a model for analyzing 
worker effort is developed and then applied to an analysis of 
105 Yugoslavian firms. As a result of this investigation an 
interesting pattern was discovered between efficient Yugoslavian 
firms and their compensation structures.  
      The productivity of workers in western industrialized 
nations has been the subject of numerous empirical studies, 
usually on an aggregate level.  Most analyses of the U.S. have 
had little luck in explaining the slowdown in the growth of 
productivity in the 1970's.  As Edward Denison put it, "what 
happened is, to be blunt, a mystery" (E.F. Denison, 1979, p.4).  
The studies that have resulted in poor explanatory power have 
had one thing in common:  they have consistently neglected the 
inner structure of the firm.  This neglect of the structure of 
the workplace follows the tradition of taking the firm's 
structure as a given, and hence views the dynamics of growth as 
solely due to resources such as capital, labor quality, energy, 
etc.  In a review of these methods, Richard R. Nelson pointed 
out that  
 
"the neoclassical theory of the firm contains two strong 
presumptions.  The first is that 'technological knowledge' 
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is the basic determinant of the input-output possibilities 
available to the firm.  The second is that management's 
'choice' among clearly defined options determines what a 
firm does.  The implicit image is of a firm as a machine, 
with some human parts, with management controlling the 
action by making choices which are implemented through 
direct command, perhaps mediated by a tight hierarchical 
structure" (R.R. Nelson, 1981, p.1037).  
This view of the firm as a machine with the workers relegated to 
the role of an appendage is consistent with early 20th century 
Taylorism. 
   Some current theoretical work in macro and micro 
economics has begun to focus on the competitive advantages that 
may result from profit-sharing, codetermination, etc. Concurrent 
with this new emphasis in economics, many organizational 
behaviorists and management scientists place great importance on 
properly gauging and, when possible, promoting the workers' job 
satisfaction.  These practitioners recognize that the workers' 
attitudes towards their jobs can be at least as important as any 
technological input in affecting productivity. Even "Business 
Week" acclaimed the quality of worklife emphasis as the "new 
industrial relations" (May, 1980).  For organizational 
behaviorists and some managers there lately, then, has come 
about a "rediscovery of workers as a significant variable in 
production equations...both management and labor have begun to 
search for more effective ways to utilize individual 
capabilities and to reach previously untapped potential" (S.A. 
Levitan and C.M. Johnson, 1982, p. 213).   Economists, though, 
for the most part, have not yet recognized this "untapped 
potential" of workers and consequently have continued to treat 
labor as an input that is unaffected by various work settings. 
When economists have attempted to gauge the effect of various 
work settings on productivity, they have been primarily 
concerned with three problems: the union, "extraction" attempts 
by management, and how the development of labor participation 
schemes affect labor productivity.  
Although pointing out different channels for worker 
attitudes to be assessed and acted upon within a union 
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workplace, the studies concerned with the union effect fail to 
make explicit how and why these attributes affect an 
individual's effort to supply greater work effort (e.g., C. 
Brown and J. Medoff, 1978; K. Clark, 1980; R.Ehrenberg,1982). 
"Radical" economists (such as S. Bowles, M. I. Naples, 
etc.) who have examined the effects of various methods 
capitalist firms use to extract a greater amount of worker 
effort  have shown that these extraction techniques 
(bureaucratic controls, unemployment, etc.) can be powerful 
explanatory variables in productivity changes, but again they 
have included them in models in an ad hoc manner.  This ad hoc 
inclusion of variables, again, is the result of not tying these 
variables to a well-defined model of human effort. 
The third type of productivity studies that also include 
important aspects of the social nature of work are studies that 
analyze the productivity effects of participation. Studies by 
Jan Svejnar, Derek Jones, Saul Estrin, etc., have helped show 
what kinds of structures and behaviors are conducive to creating 
and sustaining cooperatives in a market economy.  These studies 
suggest that a great deal of the viability of cooperatives in a 
competitive environment is due to their comparative advantage in 
labor productivity, consequently giving statistical support to 
cooperators' intuition and to theoretical arguments developed by 
Jaroslav Vanek, Branko Horvat, and others.  Many of these 
studies, however, recognize their ad hoc inclusion of variables 
that depict participatory structures and behavior, but so far no 
adequate linkage has been employed that ties these variables to 
a comprehensive theory of effort that would point to the source 
of the productivity advantage cooperatives enjoy. 
   Present and past studies on productivity generally 
neglected the importance of the inner structure of the firm; or 
when researchers have taken this into consideration, they have 
not shown precisely how the variables that they have chosen to 
reflect this essentially social structure might affect worker 
effort. Often it is the case that firm attributes found to be of 
importance in one study are neglected in another; however, it is 
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also common in many empirical studies that the detail necessary 
for a comprehensive study is unavailable.  The data set used 
here includes not only measures of capital, potential labor, 
firm income, etc., but it also has many other variables that are 
necessary for an accounting of labor supply, such as total labor 
compensation, skill levels of employees, hours of training 
within the firm, etc. 
     The next section of this paper will develop the model that 
will then be applied to the data, which is described in the 
third section of the paper. The fourth section will discuss the 
empirical results. The policy implications from both the theory 
and empirical results will then be addressed in the fifth 
section. 
 
Section II: The Model 
 
      A contribution of this empirical study is the application 
of  hierarchic preferences to the analysis of the firm. An 
hierarchic preference function allows the diverse aspects of the 
firm to affect effort in a manner consistent with theoretical 
and practical developments in utility theory.  
     In order to explicitly account for these diverse firm 
aspects' effect on worker effort and performance this study will 
use an effort function (i.e., a utility function or a de-
alienation function). The function used here is fairly general. 
It nests within it more typical homothetic functions, but if all 
parameters are non-zero the function will have the important 
property of not being homothetic. The property of non-
homotheticity is important in that most empirical work has found 
that expansion paths or income consumption curves are not 
linear, and hence are hierarchic in nature. 
Briefly, a hierarchic preference function is 
characterized by an ordered "switching" of consumption bundles 
as income increases.  As income increases, purchases of some 
goods level off or in the case of inferior goods even decline, 
while at the same time purchases of goods formerly rejected 
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increase. In recent years the use of hierarchic preferences in 
theoretical work has atrophied, for the most part, to the brief 
acknowledgement of the differing demand elasticities for 
necessities and luxuries.  In empirical work, however, 
hierarchic preferences are often used implicitly in the 
estimation of commodity demand functions.  If hierarchic 
functions are indeed fair models of preferences, it is not 
surprising that in empirical work logarithmic forms of the 
Engels curves have proved so successful (see Jackson, 1984).  
The analysis of the firm in economic studies that attempt 
to capture some aspects of the firm's structure presently 
include them as either simple dummy variables (e.g., unionized 
firm or not) or simply add them in production functions as 
additive or multiplicative terms (e.g., Brown and Medoff, 1978; 
Clark, 1980; Ehrenberg,1982),   
 
   e.g.,  Q=AKb(Lnon-union+cLunion)a.                 [1]    
                
The inclusion of these variables in this manner can be 
justified on several grounds.  The most powerful justification 
is that labor, like capital services, must be measured by some 
accounting of capacity utilized. 
In other words, effective labor input to a firm is not 
necessarily equal to the potential labor input.  The effort of 
workers will influence very profoundly the extent with which 
they utilize their abilities.  Effective labor, then, is a 
result not only of potential labor, but also of effort.  That 
is: 
 
       Effective Labor = (Effort)*(Potential Labor).      [2] 
                 
 Zero effort may be seen as equivalent to having a 
strike.  A highly motivated workforce may be able to use a large 
part of its potential; therefore, in this case the effort 
variable would be large. 
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If we let this motivational variable equal an hierarchic 
preference function and using a tractable function that captures 
the salient features of hierarchic preferences, we get: 
 
   Effort = U(workplace)=XAYBe(D/X)                   [3] 
                       
   where A, B, AX-2D > O. 
This function has the desirable properties usually 
expected of utility functions and a few more. The composite 
variables X and Y correspond to "goods" that fill the lower 
level and higher level preferences respectively. According to 
most economists and analysts of behavior, an hierarchic 
conception of effort has several different levels , but most all 
theorists would agree that at least two levels exist, and many 
would consider as the most basic partition a division of "goods" 
into two levels  (e.g., "necessities" and "luxuries;" "negative" 
and "positive" incentives; etc.). 
The broad nature of "goods" in each level creates both a 
benefit and a problem in analyzing effort.  The benefit from 
these broad levels is that most data sets on firms have 
variables that are contained within these levels.  Even if only 
a few of the variables necessary for a complete description of 
each level are available, the likely covariance of these 
variables will allow the few to act as adequate proxies for 
those variables for which no data is available.  
  The problem with using such broad levels to characterize 
human effort is to determine the "dividing line" between these 
two levels and to know which variables most adequately define 
the degree of fulfillment of each level.  To deal with this 
problem reference must be made to economic and behavioral theory 
as well as to the actual institutional setting in which the data 
was collected. 
 
Section III: Description of the Data and the Estimating 
Equations 
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The data used here, whose collection was directed by 
Janez Prasnikar of the University of Ljubljana, was collected 
from 105 industrial firms over the years from 1975 to 1979.  
These 105 firms represent approximately five percent of 
Yugoslavian industrial firms.  The firms were randomly selected 
in proportion to the number of firms in each region of the 
country (eight regions: six republics and two autonomous 
provinces) and in proportion to the number of firms within each 
of the nine industrial classifications. 
This data set is rich in detail.  There are numerous 
variables that capture the characteristics of the firm and the 
workers that are often not available in other studies. The 
simple production function analysis of the firm that many 
studies conduct need far fewer variables due to the remnants of 
the servo-mechanistic or "Tayloresque" view of the firm.  The 
hierarchic preference theory's emphasis on effective labor as a 
very important determinant of a firm's behavior will here 
utilize the detailed description of labor in these 105 firms.  
The variables selected to act as proxies for the levels 
of the effort function were chosen with both theoretical 
guidance and from the results of a survey of 1,922 workers in 
these firms (Prasnikar, 1984).  Average personal income was 
chosen to represent X, or level one of the effort function. This 
choice is consistent with the wide use of average personal 
income in theoretical models of labor managed firms which use 
average personal income as the prime variable of firm 
maximization.  Average personal income was also listed in the 
survey mentioned as the primary goal of the workers. Three other 
variables were also tried individually and together with 
personal income (i.e., collective consumption on housing, new 
workers per year, and the capital labor ratio), but were found 
to be insignificant. 
Collective consumption was ranked second in this survey.  
Although this survey did not break down collective consumption 
into two parts as was done here, collective consumption without 
housing expenditures captures not only a large part of total 
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collective consumption, but it is also consistent with the 
public goods connotation that is part of the concept sought for 
in the second level of the effort function.  Hence, collective 
consumption without housing expenditures per worker was used 
here as a proxy for level two, i.e., Y. Similar to level one, 
seven other variables were tried individually and together with 
collective consumption (e.g., training hours, low to high income 
ratio, etc.), but again they were found to be of secondary 
importance in nearly all specifications. 
The firms used here average about 1,350 employees and 
range in size from 35 to 19,287.  They have an average 
marketshare of approximately forty-one percent. The top twenty-
five observations, ranked according to labor productivity (i.e., 
Q/L), are smaller firms in terms of employees than the bottom 
twenty-five; i.e., 771 versus 1,015 respectively (see Table 2).  
As expected, the high productivity firms have a higher rate of 
capacity utilization and also greater marketshare.   There is a 
striking difference between the means for collective consumption 
expenditures per worker (i.e., Y).  The value here for the top 
observations is approximately 70 times as great as for the 
bottom. 
The dependent variable used in the estimation was value 
added (deflated, see Table 1 and the appendix for a description 
of the variables used).  The measure of capital services used 
was capital valued at purchase value (deflated) corrected for 
actual capacity utilized.  The variable used to measure 
potential labor, "L," was the number of hours worked corrected 
for the skill and education levels of the workers. 
Taking the specification of effective labor in equation 
two, i.e., 
 
Effective Labor=(Effort)*(Potential Labor)         [2]          
  
and replacing the normally used labor variable (usually just 
skill corrected labor), we get the following firm production 
function: 
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   Q = F(capital, effective labor).               [4] 
 
More specifically, in the case of a Cobb-Douglas production 
function, the production function would be the following: 
 
   Q = cKb(effective labor)a.                     
[5] 
 
   Since potential labor is equivalent to the commonly used 
skill corrected labor, potential labor here is the standard "L."  
Substituting in for the hierarchic effort function and the 
standard labor variable gives the following specification: 
 
       Q = cKb[(XAYBe(D/X))L]a              [6] 
or 
   
   Q = cKb(XaAYaBe(aD/X))La.                  [7] 
 
The two other major functional forms used were the 
transcendental function and the constant elasticity of 
substitution function. Similar to the Cobb-Douglas case above, 
these two production functions were estimated with the effort 
function having an embodied effect on labor. The use of all 
three forms gives a certain amount of robustness to the results.  
Since all of the specifications alluded to above have 
their advantages and their drawbacks all forms were estimated.  
All the variables that have so far been discussed could be 
argued to be choice variables of the firms within a given year. 
If firms determine their inputs according to the amount of 
output they expect to sell (among other things) then it could be 
also argued that there would be no simultaneity bias (A. 
Zellner, J. Kmenta, and J. Dreze, 1966).  
Given the above two arguments, regressions were run for 
all the above models with and without instrumental variables.  
Instruments used for all variables were the same.  Instruments 
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used include: firm marketshare and firm marketshare squared; a 
dummy variable indicating joint ventures with foreign firms; the 
percentage change of Yugoslavian industrial prices; the value of 
Yugoslavian imports; time; and, following MaCurdy and Pencaval 
(1986) firm-specific dummies interacted with time and time 
squared.   
Besides the three basic functional forms given above in 
which both truncated (i.e., one variable for each level as well 
as the use of first principal components) and complete 
representations (i.e., the use of all twelve variables mentioned 
earlier) of the effort function were estimated. All the 
regressions mentioned above were run with ordinary least squares 
and instrumental variables as well as with and without 
marketshare; a time trend; and regional, industry, region and 
industry, industry specific coefficients for labor and 
capital,and firm specific dummies. 
In order to impose the least number of restrictions on 
the estimates, the labor and capital coefficients were allowed 
to be industry specific, as well as allowing for firm and time 
specific effects as mentioned above. Letting Q = output, Z = 
matrix of input and structural/policy variables, the firm fixed 
effects model may be written as 
                               
 
 
lnQ = [IN ⊗  jT  jN ⊗ (IT-1 0')' Z] [λ γ µ]' + ε           [8]  
                                                                                                                          
 
where N = 105, T=5,  Q'=(Q'1, Q'2,. . .,Q'105), 
Qi = (Qi1, Qi2,. . .,Qi5)', jT = (1,1,. . .,1)' and is of dimension T x 
1. ε is defined in the same manner as Q. Lambda here represents the 
vector of firm-specific intercepts. Gamma is a vector of time-specific 
effects. Mu is a vector representing coefficients for labor, capital, 
and the effort variables (X and Y) in the matrix Z.  
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       In order to get the most efficient estimates about the 
population parameters for all of Yugoslavian industry and not for just 
these 105 firms, a random effects model was also tested.  
The random effects model may be written as 
 
  
 
     lnQ = [jN ⊗ (IT-1 0')' Z] [ γ  µ]' + ζ ⊗ jT + ε                [9]    
                        
 
where ζ = ( ζ1, ζ2, . . . ,ζN)'.  
Since in equation [9] time-specific effects are assumed 
fixed (there are only five years), the residual here with random 
firm effects becomes vit = ζi + εit. The presence of ζi causes 
correlation among observations of the same cross-sectional 
group, hence EGLS (estimated generalized least squares) must be 
used. Taylor (1980) has shown this two-step procedure to be more 
efficient than the fixed effect covariance model even if T = 2 
and N - (number of right hand side variables) ≥ 10, a condition 
which is comfortably met here.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Section IV: The Results 
 
The empirical results give tentative support to the 
hypotheses developed earlier. The results give evidence that 
average personal income (i.e., X) and collective consumption per 
worker without housing expenditures (i.e., Y) seem to have a 
particularly strong effect on worker effort and firm efficiency. 
The  observations ranked according to labor productivity 
show average personal income for the top twenty-five 
observations is almost twice that of the bottom twenty-five and 
collective consumption expenditures, i.e., Y, are many times 
higher for the efficient firms than for the less efficient.  
This finding between these two groups that there is a smaller 
difference in average personal income than collective 
consumption expenditures gives support to the hypothesis 
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developed earlier that there are likely to be clearly superior 
goods, or firm characteristics, and that specifically collective 
consumption expenditures were hypothesized to be superior goods.  
The translog and CES production functions both nest the 
Cobb-Douglas function, but they are non-nested vis a' vis 
themselves.  The translog estimates are not reported here due to 
the near perfect multicollinearity (due to the larger variable 
set that is used with the effort function included,  some cases 
they were actually computed to be perfectly collinear).  That 
left comparison of the CES and Cobb-Douglas specifications.  The 
CES estimations in all but one case (no effort function 
variables included with instrumental variables) had a higher sum 
of square errors than the Cobb-Douglas regressions.  This can be 
explained, I believe, because of inaccuracies in the iterative 
procedure for nonlinear least squares with the CES formulation.  
However, the overall conclusion was that results from the CES 
model could not be used. 
Since the translog specifications and the CES regressions 
were excluded from consideration for model selection, that left 
the remaining Cobb-Douglas regressions that were computed with a 
broad range of functional forms and procedures. The range of 
functional forms and procedures used include random firm 
effects, fixed firm effects, instrumental variables, principal 
components (of the original twelve variables considered for the 
effort function), industry specific labor and capital 
coefficients, etc. 
The question of simultaneity was addressed by running  
models with and without instrumental variables. The test 
statistic developed by Wu (1973) and extended by Kiviet (1985) 
was used. The results of this test were ambiguous1. Given the 
theoretical expectation of possibly small simultaneity bias, the 
                                                
1 For example the F value computed for the model with firm 
dummies was 2.28 versus a critical F of 3.02 with 5 and 410 
degrees of freedom and a significance level of 0.01 and the F 
value computed with only industry dummies was 4.46 versus a 
critical value of 3.17 with 5 and 506 degrees of freedom and a 
significance level of 0.01. 
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ambiguous test results, the high possibility of a type one error 
(Kiviet, 1985), and the very basic result that there is very 
little difference in the parameter estimates between the two 
models (i.e., OLS and IV), my choice here will be for the more 
parsimonious OLS models. 
The random effects model although typically more 
efficient than the fixed effects models may suffer from bias due 
to omitted variables whose effects are summarized in the fixed 
effect parameters and are correlated with other independent 
variables. An example of this in production function studies is 
differing managerial ability.  This type of bias due to the 
omission of variables (that may be unmeasurable) is not a 
problem if firm-specific effects are modeled. The existence of 
this bias was tested with the chi-square test developed by 
Hausman and Taylor (1981)1 . This test indicated there is 
significant bias when the random effects model is used versus 
the fixed effects model (i.e., the chi-square computed was 53.89 
versus the critical value for the 1 percent significance level 
at 26 degrees of freedom of 45.6). 
The model with fixed firm effects, i.e., equation two in 
table 3, was also compared with F tests against the remaining 
equations of table two. Specifications 3-5, which are nested 
within specification 2, all were found inferior. When 
considering the time, region, and industry dummies appended to 
the Cobb-Douglas function in specifications 3-5, according to F 
tests industry specific intercepts were the most powerful 
                                                
1 The specification test is from Hausman and Taylor (1981).  
 
 χ2 = (b - B)'(M1-M2)-1(b-B)
where M1=σ2
ε
[X'(IN ⊗ DT)X]
-1 , M2 = (X'Ψ-1X)-1 ,
DT is the parsing matrix IT - jTj'T /T, Ψ is the covariance matrix,
and the small "b" represents the estimator from the instrumental variablesand the vectors b and B represent the parameter estimates from 
the fixed effects and error components models respectively. 
15 
explanatory dummy set. This lack of power of the regional and 
time dummy sets is reflected in the lack of precision with which 
most of these dummies are estimated. This lack of precision is 
shown most glaringly in the regional dummies which are often 
negative, this is counterintuitive to what would be expected 
since relatively underdeveloped Kosovo is the base. Although 
measurement of these effects is not measured with much accuracy, 
they were left in the model due to the results of the F tests 
and to help ensure the unbiasedness of the effort function 
parameters. 
The labor and capital coefficients when taken together 
show the expected result of slightly decreasing returns to scale 
in equations 4 and 5. In the equations with industry specific 
labor and capital coefficients, those coefficients which have 
relatively high t-scores also typically show slightly decreasing 
returns as well. Looking at equation 4, if these same parameters 
are considered cost share parameters, the results are at some 
variance from what is usually expected.  The coefficient on 
labor, here effective labor, is estimated to be .84 and the 
capital coefficient of approximately .12 indicates that when 
effective labor is considered rather than just potential labor, 
the elasticity of output with respect to labor increases at the 
same time as it decreases for capital. 
      Since the regression without any effort function variables 
is nested within the regression using X and Y, it would be 
expected, as was found, that the sum of squared errors of this 
estimation would be greater. Which regression is more powerful 
was tested again with the F test.  As is obvious by the 
difference in the sum of squared errors for these two equations, 
the results of this test were strongly in favor of the full 
model that used X and Y (the F value computed was 156.53  versus 
a critical value of 3.78 with 3 and 500 degrees of freedom and a 
significance level of 0.01). 
This dramatically increased explanatory power of the model when 
effective labor is modeled rather than just potential labor 
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showed up in a broad number of specifications. Table 4 shows 
this extraordinary drop in error across specifications.   
       The above results indicate that there is evidence that 
the effort function specification gives a better fit in analyses 
of the firm than the traditional "black box" interpretation that 
does not consider the inner workings of the firm as important. 
The comparison of the effort function specification here with 
models that do include variables that attempt to gauge the inner 
workings of the firm must rest mainly on the precision of the 
coefficient on the extra term the effort function specification 
would add to these models, i.e., the parameter "D," or delta. (A 
real test is actually more involved since some of the variables 
used were suggested by the effort function theory, etc.) The 
parameter D, although measured with some precision by the top 
models, is not measured with much precision in others. 
       The parameters alpha and beta of the effort function were 
rather precisely estimated to be positive as expected across a 
wide range of model specifications. These two parameters and the 
parameter delta together determine whether the effort function 
estimated is consistent with an hierarchical effort function. 
The models selected as best according to statistical criteria 
from a wide variety of specifications all estimated an effort 
function (evaluated around the mean of the data) that is 
consistent with an hierarchical conception of effort. 
 
Section V: Policy Implications 
 
   The empirical application of an hierarchical preference 
function to the productivity problem did seem to garner at least 
tentative support.  This being the case, what are the 
implications for a firm if members of that firm are motivated by 
an hierarchic preferences as developed earlier in this paper?  
The concept of an ordered change in observed behavior inherent 
in the hierarchic effort function theory makes part of this 
question relatively easy to answer.  The hierarchical leveling 
of preferences implies that a firm that is attuned to these 
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needs and how they change will probably be a more efficient 
firm. This is because as the firm moved out the analogue to the 
income consumption curve the workers' effort, or welfare, would 
be greater and hence also their productivity.  This increase in 
productivity would result in a more efficient firm that would 
have greater market viability. It is in describing these needs 
and how they change that makes the above question harder to 
answer. 
      The empirical investigations undertaken here point out X 
and Y, (i.e., average personal income and collective consumption 
without housing per worker) are the most powerful attributes of 
each of the two levels of the hierarchic preference function.  
As mentioned earlier,this result is also consistent with the 
rankings that the survey of 1,922 workers in these firms 
revealed (Prasnikar, 1984).  Average personal income, as 
discussed earlier, has long been considered the primary maximand 
of workers in a labor-managed firm.  The results, however, also 
suggest that the higher level firm attributes are also 
important.  If the hierarchic preference model is true, it is 
also true then that average personal income is the primary 
maximand for the labor-managed firm only part of the time.  The 
hierarchical preference function implies that once average 
personal income has reached a certain level the higher level 
goods, here characterized by collective consumption 
expenditures, become important incentives for the firm.  Hence 
average personal income is the primary maximand only part of the 
time.  The firm that spends an ever-increasing portion of its 
disposable income on collective consumption as its disposable 
income rises would be the more efficient firm.  This supposition 
seems to be born out by not only the regressions estimated, but 
also by a comparison of collective consumption expenditures 
(i.e., Y) by the top versus the bottom twenty-five observations 
ranked according to labor productivity.  The collective 
consumption expenditures per person for the top twenty-five 
observations were almost seventy times as great as those at the 
bottom (i.e., 9,250 dinars versus 134).  
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      Using the estimated production function from equation two  
in the results section, there are a number of interesting policy 
implications that surface from an analysis of the partials of 
output with respect to X and Y.  These partials were computed 
using the overall means for the variables involved, for the mean 
values of the top twenty-five observations, and for the mean 
values of the bottom twenty-five observations.  The top firms, 
as might be suspected, seem to be splitting their income between 
X and Y in a manner that maximizes the effort function, as 
evidenced by the ratio of partials (i.e., Qx/Qy equaling 
approximately one).  An analysis of the partials using the means 
from both the bottom firms and all firms indicates that firms 
are putting too much emphasis on personal income relative to 
collective consumption expenditures (i.e., Y).  The return to 
the firm from increasing collective consumption expenditures is 
estimated here to be greater than twice as rewarding as extra 
money spent on personal income.  This result suggests that 
expenditures on collective consumption may be a vastly 
overlooked "asset," not a cost, that the average and below 
average firms should not do without. 
       A problem in the interpretation of these results is 
whether the effort function estimated here is actually a 
revelation of the workers' preferences or an observation of 
government "moral suasion" and customs.  The two different 
interpretations are difficult to disentangle.  Since regional 
governments often discourage firms from paying personal incomes 
that are well above the regional average, the firms may for this 
reason imitate an hierarchical effort function by distributing 
increased firm income in increasingly higher percentages on the 
less visible expenditures of collective consumption.  This could 
be interpreted as indirect support for the hierarchic effort 
function since the workers of the firm (as political "actors") 
should have input in the determination of regional policy, but 
this behavior would not then be a revelation of the preferences 
of any one particular firm.  To attempt to disentangle these 
competing interpretations, plots of Y on X, collective 
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consumption and average personal income respectively, were 
performed for each region with Y on the vertical axis.  If 
regional government suasion is really effective then at high 
levels of personal income the observations on collective 
consumption should increase dramatically.  Graphically this 
dramatic rise in collective consumption expenditures should 
cause a line fit to the scattergram of these points to approach 
a vertical asymptote where the regional limit on personal 
incomes is reached.  A visual inspection of these plots does 
show a dramatic rise in collective consumption expenditures as 
personal income increases, but there does not appear to be any 
definite asymptote. 
       The two variables found here to represent the effort 
function (from twelve variables originally), i.e., average 
personal income and collective consumption without housing per 
worker, were both monetary variables. Although both variables 
here are monetary variables I believe the interpretation of Y, 
i.e., collective consumption expenditures, implies a much richer 
pattern than implied by the oft-heard refrain that workers are 
"just after the money." Collective consumption expenditures in 
Yugoslavian firms are spent on such diverse items as; training 
within the firm, the organization of day care, vacation houses, 
lunches, culture in the firm (e.g., music and actors for 
celebrations), sports, holiday pay, etc. Although some of these 
items seem like typical fringe benefits, there is still an 
aspect here that is different. The focus of some of these 
expenditures on trying to support a broad range of workers' 
concerns in the workplace could give credence to interpreting 
some of these expenditures as workers' decisions to support an 
"internal supporting structure."  A structure for looking not 
just at how workers are doing individually, but also how they 
are functioning together. The importance of supporting 
structures (e.g., financial institutions, government regulatory 
bodies, indicative planning agencies, etc.) have been widely 
discussed in an attempt to keep markets viable. Thus, similar to 
these relatively large scale schemes, the success of firms here 
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that spend a relatively higher percentage of their income on 
collective consumption expenditures seems due in part to the 
success of a supporting structure inside the firm. 
       Recently there has been a renewed interest in profit-
sharing, worker ownership, etc., and its likely micro and 
macroeconomic benefits. Since the firms in this sample are all 
profit- or income-sharing firms, the results here may give some 
insight to other countries attempting to create similar 
enterprises. These results suggest that profit-sharing alone is 
no guarantee for increased firm efficiency. However, if these 
monies are spent in part on increasing support structures within 
the firm there may indeed be increased efficiency, and hence all 
the micro and macroeconomic benefits that accrue from higher 
productivity. 
The results indicate that on the basis of these data 
there is support for the hypothesis that an hierarchical effort 
function of the workers may indeed help explain variations in 
firm productivity.  Not all variables selected to be included in 
the hierarchical effort function had the predicted effect and/or 
were some of these effects measured with a great deal of 
accuracy.  However, the function as a whole generally added 
considerable explanatory power to the analysis of firm 
efficiency, and some variables in the hierarchical effort 
function clearly dominated others in explanatory power.  The two 
variables which were the most significant of the variables used 
were average personal income and collective consumption per 
worker (excluding housing expenditures). 
      These results suggest that the typical analytical maximand 
of average personal income in a labor managed firm is only, as 
expected, the firm's maximand part of the time.  If personal 
income is at a reasonably high level, these results suggest some 
types of collective consumption goods become increasingly 
important potential incentives for enhancing productivity. 
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TABLE 1 
 
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF RELEVANT VARIABLES1  
 
       Variables                    Mean         Standard  
                  Deviation 
 
Value Added, thousands of '75                              
dinars 83,658.15 17,363.11 
Labor-full time equivalents       
1,347.83 
      
2,251.11 
Labor-unskilled equivalents       
1,734.60 
      
2,947.10 
Capital-purchase value, thousands 
of '75 dinars 
    
298,426.57 
  
1,278,614.10 
Capacity Utilization          
69.18 
         
19.47 
Marketshare-firm reported          
40.99 
         
28.03 
                                                
1 Calculations are made for the period 1975-79 on the 525 panel 
observations used in estimation 
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Number of Competitors          
28.21 
         
82.46 
Joint Ventures with Foreign Firms           
0.14 
          
0.34 
Firms, number of in sample2          105  
Slovenia (firms in)          20  
Croatia          27  
Vojvodina          14  
Serbia          18  
Bosnia/Herzegovina          14  
Montenegro           2  
Macedonia           7  
Kosovo           3  
Energy Industry  
         (number of firms in) 
          2  
Metallurgy           5  
Processing of Non-Metals          12  
Metal Processing          29  
Chemical and Paper          11  
Wood           8  
Textile, Leather and Rubber          25  
Miscellaneous Industries          10  
X:Average Income Per Worker, 
thousands of '75 dinars 
         
96.19 
         
23.46 
Y:Collective Consumption Except 
Housing Per Worker, thousands of 
'75 dinars 
          
3.17 
          
3.57 
 
TABLE 2 
 
COMPARISON OF DATA OF THE TOP TWENTY-FIVE AND BOTTOM TWENTY-FIVE 
OBSERVATIONS RANKED ACCORDING TO AVERAGE LABOR PRODUCTIVITY1  
 
       Variables                   Top 25         Bottom 25 
 
Labor Productivity         
105.90 
         
15.75 
Value Added, thousands of '75                              
dinars 108,452.96 21,635.43 
Labor-full time equivalents         
771.52 
      
1,015.52 
                                                
2 Data appearing without standard deviations are sums. 
1 Average labor productivity is here defined as Q/L. Where Q is 
value added deflated by industry and L is the amount of 
unskilled labor equivalents used in a year. 
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Labor-unskilled equivalents       
1,034.86 
      
1,269.31 
Capital-purchase value, thousands 
of '75 dinars 
    
360,746.50 
     
83,188.27 
Capacity Utilization          
82.21 
         
65.22 
Marketshare-firm reported          
48.72 
         
33.52 
Number of Competitors          
12.40 
         
31.44 
Joint Ventures with Foreign 
Firms, number of in sample  
          6           1 
Firms, number of in sample           12          16 
Slovenia (firms in)           9           3 
Croatia           5           5 
Vojvodina           6           1 
Serbia           4           3 
Bosnia/Herzegovina           0           9 
Montenegro           0           0 
Macedonia           0           3 
Kosovo           1           1 
Energy Industry  
         (number of firms in) 
          5           0 
Metallurgy           3           1 
Processing of Non-Metals           1           8 
Metal Processing           2           4 
Chemical and Paper           6           0 
Wood           0           2 
Textile, Leather and Rubber           2           9 
Miscellaneous Industries           0           0 
X:Average Income Per Worker, 
thousands of '75 dinars 
        
135.47 
         
67.49 
Y:Collective Consumption Except 
Housing Per Worker, thousands of 
'75 dinars 
          
9.25 
          
0.13 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3 
 
RESULTS 
 
Random and Fixed Effects OLS estimates of the Cobb-Douglas 
Production Function Parameters for 105 Yugoslav Firms in the 
1975-79 Period 
(Values in Parentheses are Standard Errors) 
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                      Random       ____________Fixed______________ 
 
    (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5) 
 
Intercept          -5.86 
  (1.36) 
 0.65E-
16 
(0.95E-
2) 
  -9.66 
  (2.08) 
 -11.93 
  (1.86) 
   2.65 
  (0.19) 
Alpha 
(Income per 
Worker) 
   1.80 
  (0.26) 
 1.32 
(0.33) 
   2.42 
  (0.26) 
   2.43 
  (0.22) 
 
Beta  
(Collective 
Consumption per 
Worker) 
   0.08 
  
(0.006) 
 0.07 
(0.007) 
   0.11 
  
(0.007) 
   0.10 
  
(0.007) 
 
 
Delta   71.62 
 (19.50) 
 47.55 
(23.61) 
  98.40 
 (19.40) 
 109.40 
 (18.84) 
 
Firm Specific 
Effects  
   Yes           Yes     No    No    No 
lnL1 
(industry one) 
   0.96 
  (0.34) 
  0.42 
 (0.99) 
   0.69 
  (0.63) 
  
lnL2    0.69 
  (0.18) 
  2.09 
 (0.90) 
   0.66 
  (0.16) 
  
lnL3    0.92 
  (0.11) 
  0.67 
 (0.25) 
   1.14 
  (0.10) 
  
lnL4    0.77 
  (0.05) 
  0.78 
 (0.18) 
   0.78 
  (0.04) 
  
lnL5 (lnL for  
   columns 4 and 
5) 
   0.82 
  (0.09) 
  1.19 
 (0.31) 
   0.79 
  (0.07) 
  0.84 
 (0.03) 
  0.75 
 (0.03) 
lnL6    1.00 
  (0.10) 
  1.19 
 (0.20) 
   0.95 
  (0.08) 
  
lnL7    1.04 
  (0.06) 
  0.42 
 (0.26) 
   0.91 
  (0.05) 
  
lnL8    0.71 
  (0.07) 
  0.82 
 (0.36) 
   0.72 
  (0.05) 
  
lnL9    1.04 
  (0.29) 
  0.98 
 (0.35) 
   1.14 
  (0.29) 
  
lnK1    0.05 
  (0.19) 
 -0.002 
 (0.25) 
   0.29 
  (0.20) 
  
lnK2    0.22 
  (0.12) 
 -0.10 
 (0.22) 
   0.37 
  (0.12) 
  
lnK3    0.07 
  (0.07) 
  0.30 
 (0.11) 
   0.00 
  (0.55) 
  
lnK4    0.17 
  (0.04) 
  0.07 
 (0.11) 
   0.17 
  (0.03) 
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lnK5 (lnK for  
   columns 4 and 
5) 
   0.15 
  (0.05) 
  0.05 
 (0.11) 
   0.17 
  (0.06) 
  0.12 
 (0.02) 
  0.20 
 (0.02) 
lnK6    0.03 
  (0.06) 
 -0.23 
 (0.14) 
   0.08 
  (0.05) 
  
lnK7    0.004 
  (0.04) 
  0.004 
 (0.08) 
   0.04 
  (0.03) 
  
lnK8    0.20 
  (0.04) 
  0.19 
 (0.09) 
   0.19 
  (0.04) 
  
lnK9   -0.02 
  (0.17) 
 -0.10 
 (0.22) 
  -0.04 
  (0.16) 
  
Time Dummy for 
1976 
  -0.07 
  (0.03) 
 -0.08 
 (0.03) 
  -0.07 
  (0.03) 
 -0.09 
 (0.05) 
 -0.06 
 (0.05) 
Time Dummy for 
1977  
  -0.12 
  (0.03) 
 -0.10 
 (0.04) 
  -0.14 
  (0.03) 
 -0.15 
 (0.03) 
 -0.02 
 (0.05) 
Time Dummy for 
1978 
  -0.11 
  (0.03) 
 -0.06 
 (0.04) 
  -0.13 
  (0.04) 
 -0.15 
 (0.04) 
  0.08 
 (0.05) 
Time Dummy for 
1979   
  -0.09 
  (0.03) 
 -0.02 
 (0.05) 
  -0.12 
  (0.37) 
 -0.14 
 (0.04) 
  0.11 
 (0.05) 
Industry Dummy 
Variables 
     
1-Energy      8.87 
  (3.36) 
  0.22 
 (0.11) 
  0.76 
 (0.14) 
2-Metallurgy     -1.39 
  (1.14) 
  0.40 
 (0.09) 
  0.62 
 (0.13) 
3-Non-Metal 
Processing 
    -0.23 
  (0.95) 
  0.22 
 (0.07) 
  0.20 
 (0.10) 
4-Metal Processing      0.33 
  (0.94) 
  0.24 
 (0.07) 
  0.46 
 (0.10) 
5-Chemicals & 
Paper 
     0.28 
  (0.97) 
  0.40 
 (0.07) 
  0.61 
 (0.10) 
6-Wood      0.19 
  (0.96) 
  0.35 
 (0.08) 
  0.33 
 (0.11) 
7-Textile, Leather 
& Rubber 
     0.92 
  (0.93) 
  0.44 
 (0.07) 
  0.34 
 (0.10) 
8-Food and Tobacco      0.39 
  (0.96) 
  0.30 
 (0.08) 
  0.41 
 (0.10) 
Regional Dummy 
Variables 
     
Slovenia     -0.16 
  (0.08) 
 -0.21 
 (0.08 
  0.29 
 (0.10) 
Croatia     -0.11 
  (0.08) 
 -0.15 
 (0.07) 
  0.25 
 (0.10) 
Vojvodina     -0.16 
  (0.08) 
 -0.19 
 (0.08) 
  0.29 
 (0.10) 
Serbia     -0.04 
  (0.08) 
 -0.04 
 (0.08) 
  0.24 
 (0.10) 
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Bosnia/Herzegovina     -0.07 
  (0.08) 
 -0.05 
 (0.08) 
  0.12 
 (0.11) 
Montenegro     -0.20 
  (0.12) 
 -0.27 
 (0.11) 
  0.14 
 (0.15) 
Macedonia     -0.09 
  (0.09) 
 -0.13 
 (0.08) 
  0.01 
 (0.11) 
N 525 525  525 525 525 
Sum of Squared 
Errors 
 
 24.23  17.59   28.00  30.93  59.98 
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TABLE 4 
 
COMPARISONS OF THE SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS 
 BETWEEN MODELS WITH AND WITHOUT THE EFFORT FUNCTION 
 
Production Functions for 105 Yugoslav Firms During 1975-79 (Sum 
of Squared Errors are the Top Entries and the Entries in 
Parentheses are the Percentage Changes from First Row Entries) 
 
 
                     Cobb-Douglas1    Translog         CES2  
                    _____________  ____________  ____________ 
 
                      OLS    IV     OLS    IV     OLS     IV 
                    
No Effort 
Variables 
 
 
67.15 
(0) 
87.26 
(0) 
64.17 
(0) 
86.20 
(0) 
70.01 
(0) 
86.41 
(0) 
X, Y included 
 
 
33.90 
(-50) 
60.61 
(-31) 
28.89 
(-55) 
34.33 
(-60) 
128.9
3 
(84) 
65.74 
(-24) 
Principal 
Components3  
 
54.27 
(-19) 
75.78 
(-13) 
48.57 
(-24) 
51.83 
(-40) 
54.34 
(-22) 
45.81 
(-12) 
Twelve Effort 
Varialbes4  
 
38.45 
(-43) 
61.88 
(-30) 
34.68 
(-46) 
72.45 
(-16) 
54.98 
(-21) 
66.64 
(-23) 
                                                
1 All specifications have the basic production function 
variables (i.e., labor and capital) as well as industry dummy 
variables.  
2 Note that the CES functions and all estimations that used 
several effort variables (i.e., twelve and five) required the 
use of nonlinear least squares.  
3 First principal components of the variables in each level of 
the effort function were used in these regressions. 
4 The regressions here that use twelve and five effort variables 
simultaneously were found by appropriate selection tests to be 
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Five Effort 
Variables  
47.75 
(-29) 
78.16 
(-10) 
44.24 
(-31) 
98.92 
(15) 
112.4
0 
(61) 
91.47 
(6) 
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APPENDIX: Description of the Data and Variables  
 
    The data were gathered by a research team headed by Janez 
Prasnikar in 1980-81.  The firms selected represent a five 
percent random sample from Yugoslavian industrial firms (WOALS) 
stratified by region and industry.  There are a total of 735 
observations in this data set, i.e., 147 firms observed over the 
five year period of 1975-79.  525 observations remained for use 
in the regressions after deleting observations with missing 
values. 
 
Q = value added = total labor costs + total capital costs  
    + surplus = revenue - material costs. 
This variable, measured in thousands of 1975 dinars, was 
deflated using industry level price indices. 
 
K = capital = fixed capital at historical cost (purchase  
    value of capital). 
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This variable was measured in thousands of 1975 dinars.  This 
variable was also corrected each year for reported capacity 
utilization; i.e., K here is equal to (capital)*(percentage of 
capacity utilized). 
 
L = potential labor = number of unskilled worker 
equivalents = skill corrected labor given by 
 
 Lj =  i=1∑8(Ii/I1)Li 
where, Lj = the number of unskilled worker equivalents in  
firm j. Ii = the average income of skill i in Yugoslav industry 
I1 = the average income of skill one in Yugoslav industry.  Li = 
the number of workers in the ith skill group  
in the firm (of eight groups). 
 
X = The average personal income of members of the firm.  1975 
dinars. X=(firm income - total capital costs - accumulation - 
taxes - social contributions)/(labor-full time equivalents). 
Where the number of full-time equivalent workers of a firm is 
determined by the number of hours worked.   
 
Y = Income spent on collective consumption per worker.  1975 
dinars.  That portion of collective consumption spent on housing 
is not included here.  This money is spent on such things as: 
lunches, holiday pay, vacation houses, day care, education 
courses in the firm, sports, culture in the firm (e.g., 
International Women's Day [March 8], parties, celebrations with 
music, actors, etc.).  
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